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A narrative database of labour market
reforms in euro area economies

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Abstract

We present a quarterly narrative database of important labour market reforms in selected euro area economies in between 1995 and 2018 covering 60 events. We provide legal adoption and implementation dates of major reforms to employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits. Estimates based on local projections find negative short-run effects of liberalising reforms on wages, while the employment effects of reforms differ markedly across age groups and partly depend on the state of the economy.

JEL Codes: J08, O43

Keywords: Unemployment Benefits, Employment Protection, Quarterly Indicators

Non-technical Summary

This paper presents a narrative database of major labour market reforms in 11 euro area economies related to employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment benefit schemes. It then illustrates the usage of the database from various estimates of the effects of reforms.

The database contains 60 major reform events in the initial members of the euro area over the period of 1995 Q1 to 2018 Q4. 25 reforms relate to employment protection legislation (EPL) on regular contracts addressing conditions and procedures for individual or collective dismissals. Another 27 reforms address EPL on temporary contracts, outlining the conditions under which workers can be hired under this type of contract. Finally, eight reforms of unemployment benefit schemes affect eligibility criteria, replacement rates and benefit duration. Reform events are identified from OECD Economic Surveys and related reports. For a regulatory action to qualify as important, the OECD Economic Survey must either use strong normative language or the action must be mentioned repeatedly across different editions of the reports.

While the selection of events draws heavily on existing work, the database provides information on the timing of reforms in quarterly terms as a key novel feature. Based on various national and international legal sources, we document the quarterly legal adoption and implementation dates of reform events. Existing databases are only in annual terms. Quarterly information allows for a more refined analysis of the short-term impact of reforms. Moreover, the database extends existing sources to 2018 and thereby covers various major reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis.

We then illustrate potential uses of the database by estimating the short-run effects of the various types of reforms on employment and wages from local projection methods. For both types of EPL reforms we find mild negative short-run responses of employment and compensation per employee, while unemployment benefit reforms trigger a moderate increase in employment. When inspecting the employment response separately by gender and age, we find more pronounced effects for females and for young and elderly workers. Hence, it is important to inspect specific groups of employees, when assessing the effects of reforms.

1 Introduction

Labour market reforms have played a prominent role in economic policy debates in the euro area as part of efforts to support malfunctioning labour markets and spur growth in individual economies. For instance, reforms to employment protection legislation and, partly, unemployment benefit schemes have been a prominent part of the efforts undertaken by the economies that have been most hardly hit by the 2009 financial crisis. Another concentrated effort has been made in the early years of the euro area with a series of reforms related to temporary employment and unemployment benefits.

While there is a large number of micro-econometric studies (see Boeri, Cahuc, and Zylberberg, 2015), estimates of the macro-economic impact of reforms are rare. This partly reflects a lack of appropriate indicators. As with various other economic policy areas, the regulatory stance is difficult to quantify as policies are multifaceted and legislation reflects only part of their actual implementation. In this situation, studies have promoted the use purely qualitative narrative indicators of reform events to identify the impact of policy shocks in time series models, such as Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez (2018) for monetary and Budnik and Rünstler (2020) for macroprudential policies. These studies conclude that qualitative data prove useful and that the information losses compared to quantitative data remain contained.

In this paper we present a narrative database on major labour market reforms in 11 euro area economies related to employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment benefit schemes (UB). The data cover the initial members of the euro area over the period of 1995 Q1 to 2018 Q4. For the period prior to 2014, we draw on an earlier database of Duval et al. (2018), although we implement several modifications. For the remainder of the sample, we follow their approach of including only events of economic significance, as judged by OECD country reports and the annual OECD indicators of employment protection legislation.¹

While the country coverage is more limited compared to narrative databases presented by Adascalitei and Moreno (2016) and Duval et al. (2018), the present database has two distinctive features. First, it extends to 2018 and thereby covers various major reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis that are not covered by the alternative

¹The sources are described in Annex A. Indicators are available as an EXCEL file upon request.

sources. Second, we provide quarterly legal adoption and legal implementation dates, whereas existing databases are only in annual terms. Quarterly information about the timing of reforms should allow for a more refined analysis of their short-term impact. For instance, endogeneity issues can be addressed in more refined ways, as reforms are unlikely to respond to labour market developments within the same quarter.

We identify 60 major reform events, of which 25 and 27 are related to employment protection legislation (EPL) on regular and temporary employment contracts, respectively, while 8 events are related to unemployment benefit schemes. While we find events in almost every year of the sample, reforms are clustered in two specific periods. First, the years immediately before and after the formation of the euro area witnessed a number of reforms easing constraints on temporary employment contracts together with major reforms of unemployment benefit schemes in Germany and the Netherlands. Second, a number of reforms undertaken after 2010 in those economies that have been most hardly hit by the financial crisis targeted mostly EPL of regular contracts, but also partly reversed earlier liberalisation of temporary contracts.

We then illustrate potential uses of the database by estimating the short-term effects of the reforms on employment and wages from local projection methods. In a companion paper, Rünstler (2021) uses the database to estimate the short- and medium-term macroeconomic impact of reforms from a Bayesian narrative panel VAR. He reports sizeable medium-term effects of regular contract EPL and of unemployment benefit reforms. In this paper, we focus on the short-term effects of reforms on the aggregate real wage and on employment effects by gender and age groups. For both types of EPL reforms we find mild negative short-run responses of total employment and compensation per employee, while unemployment benefit reforms trigger a moderate increase in employment. When inspecting the employment response separately by gender and age groups, we find yet that these effects are clearly more pronounced for young and elderly workers. Hence, it appears to be important to look at the heterogeneous responses of specific groups of employees when assessing the effects of labour market reforms.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used for constructing the database. Section 3 discusses the main features of euro area labour market reforms. Section 4 presents the estimates of their macroeconomic effects. Section 5 concludes.

2 Construction of the Database

Our narrative database is an extension of the work of Duval et al. (2018) with a focus on labour market reforms in selected euro area economies. In particular, we maintain a similar methodology of identifying reforms of economic significance. Our contribution is twofold. First, we expand the database to include labour market reforms promulgated after 2014 and until 2018. Second, we use legal sources to establish the timing of reforms in quarterly terms. We report both quarterly announcement and implementation dates, i.e. the quarters in which the reforms were approved by the legislators and in which the laws entered into force.

We consider three categories of reform events, i.e. changes to employment protection legislation for regular workers, employment protection legislation for temporary workers, and unemployment benefits. We provide a description of the categories in section 3. We consider 11 countries, i.e. the initial members of the euro area including Greece (which joined in 2001) but excluding Luxembourg, over the period of 1995 Q1 to 2018 Q4. The end of the sample is dictated by the availability of OECD country reports. We consider both liberalizing and tightening reforms.²

The individual events are listed in Annex A.2 including adoption and implementation dates, a brief description of the event, and the major sources used to determine the economic significance and the timing of the events. The indicators take a value of 1 in a quarter where a liberalizing reform was implemented (adopted), a value -1 in case of a tightening, and zero otherwise.

Overall, the construction of the data proceeds in three steps. First, we follow Duval et al. (2018) in identifying major reform events from OECD Economic Surveys and related reports. Second, we also inspect the changes in related annual OECD indicators to identify those reforms that feature sufficiently large changes in these indicators. While we do not exclude any reform based on this criterion, we add the annual change of the indicators to the database to allow for a potential narrower selection of events. Third, we derive the quarterly dates of reforms from legal documents provided by the LABREF database and a variety of national sources.

Identifying Major Events. For the years 1995 to 2013 we draw on the set of events identified by Duval et al. (2018). For the remainder of the sample we follow the methodology devised

²We refrained from including the New Member States of the euro area, as many of those joined the OECD well after the start of our sample and are not covered by OECD reports beforehand.

by Duval et al. (2018). We identify all legislative and regulatory actions related to the above reform categories mentioned in OECD Economic Surveys for the 11 countries in the sample. For a regulatory action to qualify as a major liberalizing or tightening reform one of the following two alternative criteria has to be met: (i) the OECD Economic Survey uses strong normative language to define the action as an important measure; or (ii) the policy action is mentioned repeatedly across different editions of the OECD Economic Survey for the country considered, or in the retrospective summaries of key past reforms that are featured in some editions.

Compared with other existing databases on policy actions in the area of labour market institutions, such as the European Commission's LABREF and Adascalitei and Moreno (2016), this approach aims at identifying a limited set of major reforms, as opposed to a long list of actions that in many cases would be expected to have little or no bearing on macroeconomic outcomes.

Comparison with OECD Indicators on EPL. Another source of information on the economic relevance of EPL reforms is the annual OECD indicators on the strictness of employment protection. These indicators are not strictly of a quantitative nature. They assess legislation rather than implementation aggregating expert judgement on sub-categories of employment protection law with weights that are again determined by judgement. They may therefore reflect rather the complexity than the scale of individual reforms. Nevertheless, they have been used for assessing the impact of reforms (Bassanini and Duval, 2009; Bouis et al., 2012).³

For EPL reforms, we add the change in the indicator related to the individual reforms in the same or subsequent year to the database to potentially allow for a narrower selection of events. Following Duval et al. (2018) we refrain from requiring that an event included in the database is associated with a large change in the indicator. In several cases this contradicts other information on the relevance of reforms. Moreover, different vintages of the OECD indicators give fairly different outcomes for several events. Nevertheless, further narrowing down the events to those associated with a change in the OECD indicator may be useful for some applications and we do so in our empirical application in section 4 as well.

Figures A.1 compare the narrative indicators with the OECD indicators. The latter measure the regulatory stance on 1, January of a given year. In most cases, a reform event is therefore

³See <https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm> and <https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection-methodology.htm>.

reflected in a change in the subsequent year. The graphs show a reasonably high coincidence of major changes in the OECD indicators with the narrative approach. but with a few exceptions. For Belgium, for instance, two changes in the OECD indicators are not associated with events identified by narrative approach. Vice versa, a few events identified by the narrative method are not reflected in a change in the OECD indicator.

Quarterly Information on the Timing of Reforms. To map the reforms into a quarterly time schedule we inspect directly the original legal sources documenting these reforms. In particular, we use the Flash Reports on Labour Law and the LABREF database of the European Commission,^{4 5} together with government gazette electronic publications and other websites containing information about the promulgated laws. From these sources we were able to pinpoint both the date of adoption and the date of entry into force of the laws at a quarterly level. As general criterion, we use the quarter in which the law has been approved by the national parliaments as the *Date of Adoption* and the quarter in which the law actually came into legal force as the *Date of Implementation*.

In a few cases, reforms were initiated by a decree passed by the legal system that set the pace of the reform but described it only in broad terms, while the content was detailed by the parliament in a subsequent law. In such circumstances, we defined the Date of Adoption from the decree. Moreover, when laws were adopted or implemented in several stages, we decided in some instances to split up reforms that are represented as a single event in the annual database of Duval et al. (2018) into several events. From the closer inspection of their timing, various events end up represented in different years in our database compared to Duval et al. (2018).

3 Features of Euro area Labour Market Reforms

Definition of Reforms. The data cover three different types of reforms. First, 8 reforms of unemployment benefit schemes affect eligibility criteria, replacement rates, and benefit duration.

Second, 25 reforms relate to employment protection legislation (EPL) on regular contracts addressing conditions and procedures for individual or collective dismissals, such as terms of

⁴<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1143&langId=en#LABREF>

⁵<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&langId=en>

notice, severance payments, or rules for fair dismissal. In particular, legislation sets the conditions under which it is possible to lay off employees and the sanctions in the case of breach of these provisions. These regulations also detail the procedures that should be followed in the case of dismissals, which might include provisions for notice periods, involvement of third parties as well as procedures for the employee to challenge the lay-off decision. Finally, these regulations specify monetary compensations employees are entitled to, once dismissed (severance payments). Additional provisions exist in all OECD countries in the case of collective dismissals and typically include additional procedural inconveniences for the employer.⁶

Table 1: Number of reform events

	1995-2018		1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	Implementation Lag		
	All	+	1999	2004	2009	2014	2018	0	1	> 1
EPL Regular	25	22	5	5	3	9	3	10	9	6
EPL Temporary	27	20	8	9	1	6	3	13	9	5
UE Benefits	8	6	1	0	2	3	2	2	2	4

The table shows the overall number of reform events together with the number of regulatory easings (+). The implementation lag refers to the number of periods (quarters) between legal adoption and implementation.


Third, another 27 reforms relate to EPL on temporary contracts, which outline the conditions under which workers can be hired on fixed-term or other types of contracts (such as seasonal contracts or project-related contracts). Regulation usually concerns the type of jobs and activities in which these contracts are allowed, their maximum duration, and conditions for their renewal or the termination of employment including possible employee compensation in the case of termination.

Distribution Across Countries and Over Time. Reforms are unevenly distributed across countries and over time. First, 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed reforms of temporary contract EPL in a large number of countries mostly easing the conditions for temporary contracts. The reform momentum stalled at around 2005 as the outcomes were disregarded as disappointing, see e.g. Blanchard and Landier (2003) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2007).

⁶see e.g. Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009) and the OECD 2004 Employment Outlook for a detailed description of employment protection regulations in OECD countries.

In 2006, Germany and the Netherlands implemented major reforms of unemployment benefits. Otherwise, the number of reforms was pretty small in between 2005 and 2010. However, given the need for reviving labour markets a series of major reforms to regular contract EPL were implemented in between 2010 and 2015 in those member countries that were hit particularly hard by the financial crisis. Most of these reforms targeted firing costs. Spain, Portugal and Greece substantially lowered requirements for severance payments or shortened the terms of notice for dismissals bringing them closer to the levels prevailing in other euro area member states from partly high levels. Some of these deregulations were accompanied by a tightening of temporary contract EPL in order to encourage the creation of employment on regular contracts. However, the deregulation of regular contracts was far more substantial. One exception to this rule is the 'flexicurity' reform in Italy in 2015, which combined deregulation of regular contract EPL with an increase in unemployment benefits.

Figure 1: Number of Events over Time




The plot shows the number of reform events in each individual year.

Figure 1 plots the number of reforms over time. Overall, reforms were predominantly put in place during times of weak economic activity at around 2003 and in between 2010 and 2013. Adascalitei and Morano (2016) estimate the determinants of reforms from probit regressions and identify high unemployment and fiscal consolidation needs as important determinants.

Implementation Lags. For the majority of EPL reforms, legislation became effective either in the

same quarter when the law was legally adopted or the quarter thereafter. Only four events have implementation lags beyond one quarter. For unemployment benefit reforms, implementation lags are higher with lags of beyond four quarters for three events out of seven events. In particular, the changes to unemployment benefits under the German Hartz reforms were legally adopted in 2003 Q1, but became effective only in 2006 Q1.

Figure 2: Number of Events across Countries



The plot shows the number of reform events in each individual country.

4 Short-term Effects of Labour Market Reforms

This section illustrates the usage of the database by studying the effects of reforms on macro-economic aggregates and, in particular, on employment patterns from local projections methods.

Only a few attempts have been made so far to study the short-term effects of labour market reforms from time series methods. These studies have used local projection methods to inspect the effects of labour market reforms on aggregate employment in industrialised economies. Bouis et al. (2012) inspect unemployment benefit reforms as measured from shifts in the OECD regulatory stance indicators, while Duval and Furceri (2018) and Duval, Furceri, and Jalle (2020) build on the narrative dataset of Duval et al. (2018) that also includes EPL reforms. The former two studies find effects of unemployment benefit reforms on employment, but the impact of EPL reforms remains insignificant. Duval, Furceri, and Jalle (2020) inspect sectoral differences in average lay-off rates and find a significant increase in employment in industries with high relative lay-off rates relative to low lay-off rates after three years.

In their review of the micro-econometric literature on reforms Boeri et al. (2015) conclude that UB reforms have pronounced short-run effects on unemployment duration, while the findings on EPL reforms are ambiguous. Both hiring and lay-off rates increase after a deregulation, but the effect on lay-offs tends to be larger implying a negative net effect on employment. There is however some evidence for positive effects of regular contract EPL deregulation beyond the short run (e.g. Autor et al. 2006). Only a few studies examine the effects of reforms on wages, again with mixed results. Tatsiramos and van Ours (2012) conclude that there are on average no effects of changes in UB schemes on the wage paid in the post-unemployment job. As to EPL reforms, van der Wiel (2010) reports an increase in wages after a tightening in the terms of notice for elderly workers in the Netherlands. Exploiting differences in the treatment of small and large firms, Martins (2009) finds that EPL deregulation lowered wages in Portugal, whereas Leonardi and Pica (2013) find the opposite for Italy.

It has further been argued that the effects of EPL reforms are smaller and subject to long delays during episodes of low economic growth. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) claim that temporary contract EPL reforms generate no more than a transient 'honeymoon' effect on employment during booms, while being ineffective during recessions as firms are constrained by the stock of employees on permanent contracts. Similarly, New Keynesian models with search frictions suggest a more delayed employment response to a reduction in firing costs during recessions (Cacciatore et al., 2016). Related empirical evidence has been provided by Gehrke and Weber (2017) for Germany and Duval, Furceri, and Jalle (2020) for a panel of industrialised countries.

In companion work, Rünstler (2021) uses the database of this paper to estimate the impact of reforms on macro-economic aggregates from a Bayesian narrative panel VAR. In this paper we complement these estimates by inspecting a larger set of labour market indicators from local projection methods. While being less efficient (Budnik and Rünstler, 2020; Li et al., 2021), local projections have the advantage that they allow studying a larger set of series.

We apply the local projection technique proposed of Jordà (2005) to estimate the responses of employment and real wages to reform events. The method requires estimation of a series of regressions across horizons h and for each variable of interest. We estimate the equations

$$y_{c,t+h} - y_t = \mu_c + \alpha_h z_{c,t} + \Delta x_{c,t}^T \beta + u_t, \quad (1)$$

where the h -step ahead change in the variable of interest, $y_{c,t}$, is regressed on narrative indicator $z_{c,t}$ and a set of control variables $x_{c,t}$ for country c and in period t . We estimate equation (1) from a series of panel regressions across countries separately for each horizon h and include country fixed effects μ_c to capture country heterogeneity. The set of coefficients α_h for $h = 1, \dots, H$ then gives the dynamic response of $y_{c,t}$ to the reform events embodied indicators $z_{c,t}$, averaged across events and countries. We subsequently smooth the estimates of α_h using the method proposed by Barnichon and Brownless (2019) to improve the efficiency of estimates. We use a smoothing parameter of $\lambda = 1$. Thus, one constructs the impulse responses and the corresponding error bands from the sequence of smoothed coefficients α_h and their standard errors.

We consider employment outcomes by gender and for different age groups together with the real wage. Our sample covers the 11 euro member states covered by our database over the period of 2000 Q1 to 2018 Q4. In order to focus on major events, we eliminate those EPL reforms that are not associated with a change in the corresponding OECD indicators as shown in Figures in Annex A.1. This finally results in a set of 15 regular contract, 16 temporary contract, and 7 unemployment benefit reforms. The data on employment are taken from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey. The survey offers employment by gender and age groups. The real wage is calculated as compensation per employee deflated by the harmonized index of consumer prices.

We include a large set of control variables $x_{c,t}$ in the regressions to insure against lagged dependencies in the implementation of reforms on economic developments. As discussed by Stock and Watson (2018), proper identification requires that, after accounting for controls, indicator $z_{c,t}$ is exogenous to $y_{c,t}$ at all leads and lags. Adascalitei and Moreno (2016) find reform events to be affected by domestic labour market and, to a lesser extent, fiscal conditions. Vector $x_{c,t}$ therefore includes four lags of the dependent variable together with four lags of GDP, aggregate employment, the consumer price index, the real wage, the 10-year government bond spread vis-a-vis Germany, and the euro area shadow interest rate, U.S. GDP, and a world commodity price index. All these variables enter equation (1) in log-differences. We also add a linear trend and dummies to account for various outliers in the series.⁷

⁷The data are mainly taken from the Eurostat National Accounts, while the euro area shadow rate estimates are from Krippner (2013). These data are available at <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/>. US real GDP and the world commodity price index are taken from the IMF IFS and OECD MEI databases, respectively.

Figure 3: Main Aggregates





Figure 4: Impact of Reforms by Gender




The graphs show responses (in %) to liberalising reforms together with [.,.9] confidence bands.

The results for total employment and real compensation per employee are shown in Figure 3. We find moderate declines in employment and real compensation for both types of EPL reforms, and an increase in employment for UB reforms. The responses are yet insignificant, with few exceptions. For regular contract EPL, the wage response is significant at very short horizons, as measured from [10 %, 90 %] confidence bands, while for temporary contract EPL both wage and employment responses approach significance at horizons of about two years.

For the breakdown of total employment by gender and for different age groups we obtain more pronounced results. As to gender, differences between males and females are rather small for EPL reforms. For UB reforms, the response of female employment is yet larger than the one of male employment and clearly significant. Differences are even more pronounced for age groups.

Figure 5: Impact of Reforms for Different Age Groups



The graphs show responses (in %) to liberalising reforms together with [.1, .9] confidence bands.

The results indicate that the burden of short-term adjustment to EPL reforms is mostly borne by young and elderly workers. While the centre age group of 25 to 54 years shows very little response to any type of reform, employment drops by about 5% for workers at the age of 55 to 64 years. Similarly, employment of workers in between 15 and 24 years declines by close to 3%, although the responses are not significant. The results for UB reforms show similar patterns with immediate increases in the employment of young and elderly workers, while the age group of 25 to 45 years shows a very gradual and smaller response.⁸


Finally, we consider state dependencies. We split the reforms in two groups depending on the state of the euro area business cycle in the year preceding implementation and estimate equation (1) separately for each group. We measure the state of the cycle from annual euro area GDP growth with the high state defined as growth being above its sample average. Using euro area GDP avoids potential endogeneity issues that might arise with country-specific measures of the state. As shown in Figure 6, the results provide some indication of state dependence in the impact of regular contract EPL. For both males and females, a liberalisation results in a decline in employment in states of low growth, but an increase in states of high growth. This pattern appears particularly pronounced for young workers. Employment of elderly workers declines in both states, but the decline is larger in the low state of the cycle. We do not find state dependence for temporary contract EPL and unemployment benefit reforms.

5 Conclusions

In this note we present a quarterly narrative database on major labour market reforms undertaken in 11 euro area member states in between 1995 and 2018 and illustrate its use by estimating the short-term response in employment by gender and age groups from local projection methods. We find that the responses are concentrated among young and, in particular, elderly workers, while the impact on the centre age group is insignificant. This not only indicates that the burden of short-term adjustment to EPL reforms is mostly borne by these groups, but more generally suggests that it is important to look at the heterogeneous responses of specific groups of employees when assessing the effects of labour market reforms.

⁸The drop in employment at longer horizons may be due to the fact two major reforms took place in 2006, 3 years before the Great Recession. This might affect the outcomes at horizons of above 10 quarters. Generally, results of local projections get yet unreliable at longer horizons (Budnik and Rünstler, 2020, Li et al., 2021).

Figure 6: Impact in States of High and Low Growth



The graphs show responses (in %) to liberalising reforms together with [.1, .9] confidence bands.

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Annex A.1: The database

The following tables provide a collection of major structural labour market reforms in 11 euro area economies between 1995 Q1 to 2018 Q4. The reforms are assigned to either of three categories, i.e. employment protection legislation for regular contracts, employment protection legislation related to temporary contracts, and unemployment benefits. Some reforms appear in more than one category. The data are also available as an EXCEL file upon request.

We should stress that a significant part of the information contained in the database, i.e. most events prior to 2014 and the corresponding sources, are taken directly from Duval et al. (2018). However, we refine part of the information, add events in between 2014 and 2018, and establish the timing of reforms in quarterly terms. Following Duval et al. (2018) we identify the set of reforms from the OECD Economic Surveys published after 2015. We report the passages from the OECD Economic Survey publications whenever available. For several countries, OECD Economic Survey publications were not available for the most recent years. In these cases, we relied on LABREF⁹ and the Flash Reports on Labour Law¹⁰ to identify the major reforms. The tables then refer to the alternative sources providing the relevant descriptions. The reforms are classified as tightening (i.e. an increase in regulation) or liberalizing (i.e. a decrease in regulation). The former are indicated by -1 and the latter by 1 in column *Direction*. The national laws implementing the reforms are indicated in column *Source*.


To map the reforms into a quarterly schedule we referred to the original legal sources of the structural reforms making extensive use of the Flash Reports on Labour Law and the LABREF database by the European Commission, together with government gazette electronic publications or other websites containing the text and the information of the promulgated laws. By working directly with the original sources we were able to pinpoint the date of decision and the date of entry in force of the normative texts at the quarterly level. As a general criterion, we used the quarter in which the law was approved by the national parliaments as the *Date of Decision/Adoption* and the quarter in which the law actually came into force, as the *Date of Implementation*. In many instances, these two dates coincide. In several cases, when laws were adopted or implemented in several stages, we split up reforms that are represented as a single event in Duval et al. (2018) into several events. Moreover, from the closer inspection of their timing, various events end up represented in different years compared to Duval et al. (2018).

Figures A.1 plot the timing of employment protection reforms against the annual OECD indicators of employment as explained in section 2 of the main text.

⁹<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1143&langId=en#LABREF>


¹⁰<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&langId=en>

Figure A.1: Comparison with OECD Employment Protection Indicators




The plots show individual reform events and the corresponding change in the OECD indicators on employment protection legislation.

Figure A.1: Comparison with OECD Employment Protection Indicators



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The plots show individual reform events and the corresponding change in the OECD indicators on employment protection legislation.

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
AT	EPL regular workers	In the new system the management of severance pay is attributed to retirement accounts, which are legally independent from the employers and funded by employers via a monthly untaxed payment of some 1.5 per cent of gross wages. Accumulated entitlements rest in the employee's account until retirement, unless the work contract has been terminated by the employer, which makes cash payments admissible under certain conditions... (OECD Economic Surveys: Austria 2003 pg. 66)	1	BGBI. I No. 100/2002 (Bundesgesetz über die betriebliche Mitarbeiterversorge (Betriebliches Mitarbeiterversorgungsgesetz (BMVG)) https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/2002_100_1/2002_100_1.pdf https://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/textdisplay.severancePay?p_lang=en&p_country=AT&p_all_years=Y	Q1 2003	Q3 2002

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
DE	EPL regular workers	<p>Legislation easing employment protection provisions... came into force in October 1996... The employment ceiling for enterprises above which employment protection is applicable was raised from five to ten employees per firm. The number of enterprises which are not subject to the general job protection law was thereby increased by some 15 percent. These companies employ some 30 per cent of all employees... With respect to large scale redundancies, the general requirement to consider social criteria in selecting employees to be made redundant was relaxed, with greater emphasis given to economic factors... the measures reduce the costs and uncertainty of taking on new workers, thereby increasing the possibility for the unemployed and new entrants into the labour market to make the transition into permanent employment... (OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 1997, pg.132)</p>	1	<p>BGBl. I 1996 S. 1476. Arbeitsrechtliches Gesetz zur Förderung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung (Arbeitsrechtliches Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGB1&jumpTo=bgbl196s1476.pdf http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP13/1217/121728.html</p>	Q4 1996	Q4 1996
DE	EPL regular workers	<p>The Protection against Dismissal Act (PaDA) states that a dismissal is "socially unjust" and, hence, invalid if there is no suitable reason (§ 1). A dismissal is socially justified only (1) in cases of personal misconduct, (2) lack of individual capabilities or (3) due to business needs and compelling operational reasons. Moreover, in the third case the PaDA requires that firms select workers or employees to be dismissed in accordance with criteria such as age, tenure, alimony duties or individual disabilities. Until 2003, the regulations of the PaDA are generally applied to all firms with more than five permanent employees. Since 2004, the four criteria of age, tenure, maintenance payments, and individual disability are listed explicitly in § 1(3) of the PaDA [see https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1619.pdf]</p>	-1	<p>BGBl. I S. 3002 2003 http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP15/933/93393.html</p>	Q1 2004	Q4 2003

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL regular workers	The draft law simplifies lay-off procedures. Dismissal of a small number of workers (treated as if they were individual dismissals) would no longer require prior consultation with workers' representatives and administrative authorization. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1994, pg. 81)...the Government has presented a draft law modifying existing labour legislation significantly... Lay-offs of permanent employees will be made much easier, notably by abolishing in many cases the requirement of administrative authorization. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1994, pg.88-89)... far-reaching labor market reforms aimed at lifting barriers to job creation. A decree was passed at the end of 1993 and a draft has been presented to Parliament and is expected to become law by the middle of 1994. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1994, pg.80). This draft law breaks with the corporatist philosophy of past legislation and is expected to increase labour market flexibility considerably. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1994, pg.88-89)	1	Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995, de 24 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdlg/1995/03/24/1	Q2 1995	Q1 1995

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL regular workers	Employers and trade unions agree on a labour market reform which would encourage the creation of indefinite-term jobs. Inter alia, it calls for the introduction of a new type of indefinite-term contract with reduced redundancy costs for certain groups of workers, a new definition of the grounds for economic redundancies and proposals for improving the collective bargaining process. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1998, pg. 179)	1	Real Decreto-ley 8/1997, de 16 de mayo, de medidas urgentes para la mejora del mercado de trabajo y el fomento de la contratación indefinida https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/1997/05/16/8 Ley 63/1997, de 26 de diciembre, de Medidas Urgentes para la Mejora del Mercado de Trabajo y el Fomento de la Contratación Indefinida https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1997-27989/p=20010710/tn=1	Q4 1997	Q2 1997

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL regular workers	<p>New measures taken in early 2001 have broadened the 1997 reform... (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 2001, pg. 65-66) In March 2001 the government approved a deepening of the 1997 labour market reform. The measures adopted include:- An extension of the new permanent contract introduced in the 1997 labour market reform beyond May 2001.- The permanent contract with reduced firing costs will continue to apply to specific groups (workers aged 18-29, workers with a temporary contract, workers aged over 45, workers that have been unemployed for more than one year, women in some professions), and has been extended to young workers (now defined as those aged between 16 and 30), long-term unemployed (for more than 6 months), unemployed women in sectors where they are underrepresented (most of them) and disabled workers... (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 2003, pg. 66)</p>	1	<p>Real Decreto-ley 5/2001, de 2 marzo, de Medidas Urgentes de Reforma del Mercado de Trabajo para el incremento del empleo y la mejora de su calidad https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/2001/03/02/5</p> <p>Ley 12/2001, de 9 de julio, de medidas urgentes de reforma del mercado de trabajo para el incremento del empleo y la mejora de su calidad https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2001/07/09/12</p>	Q3 2001	Q1 2001

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL regular workers	<p>The labour market reform, approved in September 2010... aims to reduce the upper range of dismissal costs for permanent contracts and to smooth the difference in dismissal costs between temporary and permanent contracts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First, the law aims to make it easier for firms to have dismissals accepted by the courts as justified. If this reform is effective, it will reduce severance payment of firms substantially, from the current practice of 45 days' wages to 20 days' wages. • Second, it broadens the base for which the permanent contract with reduced severance payment of 33 days' wages can be applied and guarantees that this reduced severance pay also applies now in cases where firms would prefer to declare the dismissal up front as "unjustified" (to avoid litigation). • Third, the introduction of a capital-funded component, similar to the one introduced in the framework of the Austrian severance pay reform, further reduces the one time costs of dismissal. <p>(OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 2010, pg. 103)</p>	1	<p>Real Decreto-ley 10/2010, de 16 de junio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/2010/06/16/10 Ley 35/2010, de 17 de septiembre, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo https://www.boe.es/eli/es/1/2010/09/17/35</p>	Q3 2010	Q2 2010

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL regular workers	<p>The 2012 labour market reform aims to reduce further the duality in the Spanish labour market, with a reform of employment protection legislation...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The law redefines the economic reasons for dismissal, clarifying the conditions under which a dismissal for economic reasons is justified. In this case, the employer pays 20 days' wages of severance pay per year of seniority. • If a dismissal is judged unjustified, the maximum severance pay is reduced to 33 days' wages per year of seniority up to a maximum of 24 months, compared with 45 days and 42 months on the regular permanent contract before. This applies to new contracts and to future years of service on existing contracts. • The law eliminates the need for administrative authorisation of collective dismissal, in line with regulations in most European countries. • While it removes the option of express dismissal, according to which firms could declare the dismissal upfront as being "unjustified" and pay 45 days' wages per year of seniority to avoid litigation, firms no longer are obliged to pay interim wages during the period the case is adjudicated. • The law introduces a new type of permanent contract for companies with fewer than 50 employees. Hiring on this new contract is subject to an extended trial period of one year, compared with a previous maximum of six months, and various tax credits. <p>(OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 2012, pg. 98)</p>	1	<p>Real Decreto-ley 3/2012, de 10 de febrero, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/2012/02/10/3 Ley 3/2012, de 6 de julio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral https://www.boe.es/eli/es/1/2012/07/06/3/con</p>	Q3 2012	Q1 2012

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
FI	EPL regular workers	In March 1996, several acts were submitted to the parliament regarding labour market reform aimed at stimulating new hiring... Employers' period of notice has been shortened to one month (from two months) and that for employees to fourteen days (from one month)... (OECD Economic Surveys: Finland 1996, pg. 78). Notice periods for employers and employees have been halved, to one month and two weeks, respectively (OECD Economic Surveys: Finland 1997, pg. 63).	1	605/1996 Työaikalaki https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1996/19960605	Q4 1996	Q2 1996
FR	EPL regular workers	...government introduced the Social Modernisation Law in 2002, significantly tightening the constraints on dismissal of more than 10 employees...in 2003 the new government suspended some of these provisions before introducing another law in 2004 which, while moderating some aspects of EPL, increased the obligation on employers to try to find alternative jobs for employees under threat of collective dismissal... The law permits "economic" dismissal only if it is necessary to preserve the competitiveness of the firm. Financial rationalisation by the management is not sufficient justification...in 2002 the Social Modernisation Law added a provision requiring that the financial position of the group to which the firm belongs should be taken into account, which means that an economic dismissal is not legally justified if the group is healthy. (OECD Economic Surveys: France 2005, pg. 105)	-1	Loi n° 2002-73 du 17 janvier 2002 de modernisation sociale https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2002/1/17/MESX0000077L/jo/texte	Q1 2002	Q4 2001

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
FR	EPL regular workers	Layoff law has been simplified by introducing the possibility of mutually agreed termination (rupture conventionnelle) of the CDI. (OECD Economic Surveys: France 2009, pg. 52)	1	Loi n° 2008-596 du 25 juin 2008 portant modernisation du marché du travail https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2008/6/25/MTSX0805954L/jo/texte	Q2 2008	Q2 2008
FR	EPL regular workers	A number of recent labour market reforms are worthy of praise. The 2013 simplification of collective layoff procedures in case of proven economic difficulties is clearly a step in the right direction. Since this reform, the proportion of Employment Safeguard Plans (Plan de Sauvegarde de l'Emploi, PSE) appealed against has fallen from 25% to 8% thanks to greater negotiation within firms. The July 2013 law opens the way to greater “flexicurity” and improved labour-management relations through legally secured firm-level “opt out” agreements that allow for temporary suspension of contracts or collective agreements. (OECD Economic Surveys France 2015, pg. 34) The Act of 14 June 2013 simplified collective layoff procedures and made them more secure. In 2013, employer contributions to unemployment insurance rose for short-term contracts. An exemption from employer contributions to unemployment insurance was also introduced for signing a permanent employment contract with a young person aged under 26. The draft law on “growth, activity and equal economic opportunity” provides for reform of legal and labour court procedures. (OECD Economic surveys: France 2015 pg. 54)	1	Loi du 14 juin 2013 relative à la sécurisation de l'emploi https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027546648	Q2 2013	Q2 2013

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
FR	EPL regular workers	The 2016 labour reform facilitated firm-level agreements regarding working-time arrangements. (OECD Economic Surveys 2017, pg. 62)	1	Loi relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la sécurisation des parcours professionnels du 8 août 2016 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000032983213/	Q3 2016	Q3 2016

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
FR	EPL regular workers	In France, two major reforms have attempted to limit the use of temporary contracts by increasing incentives to hire on permanent contracts: the 2016 Law on employment, modernisation of social dialogue and safeguarding of professional careers (the “Labour” Law, so-called El Khomri Law) and the Ordonnance of September 2017 on the predictability and securing of employment relationships. These reforms clarified the definition of real and serious cause for the dismissal on economic grounds of employees on permanent contracts, and aimed to improve the predictability of compensation in the event of unfair dismissal, as recommended in the new OECD Jobs Strategy (OECD, 2018). Clarification of the definition of fair dismissal and procedural breaches. The “Labour” Law introduced objective criteria for the definition of economic difficulties that give sufficient ground for dismissal for economic reasons in terms of a significant reduction of at least one of the indicators referred to in the Law. The Ordonnance limited the scope of assessment of an economic situation justifying a fair dismissal for companies in the same group and operating solely on national territory (thus excluding foreign companies in the same group). The Ordonnance also clarified the definition of a procedural breach. If there are no other reasons for considering the dismissal to be unfair, the procedural breach results in compensation which may not exceed one month’s salary. Increased severance pay. The Ordonnances reduced the minimum tenure required for entitlement to severance pay from 12 months to 8 months. It also increased severance pay by 25%, from 1/5 to 1/4 of the monthly salary per year of service. (OECD Economic Surveys France 2019, pg. 125)	1	Ordonnance nr 2017-1386 du 22 septembre 2017 relative à la nouvelle organisation du dialogue social et économique dans l’entreprise et favorisant l’exercice et la valorisation des responsabilités syndicales https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000035607348&categorieLien=id	Q3 2017	Q3 2017

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
GR	EPL regular workers	<p>The following measures were introduced in 2010 (Laws 3863/2010 and 3899/2010) to facilitate job re-allocation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction in notice period. The notice period prior to dismissal of white collar workers has been reduced substantially. For an employee working 28 years or more, for example, notification is reduced to 6 from 24 months. The new provisions lower total severance costs for white collar workers with long tenure. Employers now have a clear incentive to provide notice of dismissal for workers with long tenure, in which case their severance payments are halved. • New rules for the settlement of severance payments... make it possible for severance payment, when it exceeds 2 months' pay, to be paid in installments. • Redefinition of collective dismissal rules. The new law increases the threshold above which dismissals are characterised as collective to 6 employees for enterprises with 20-150 employees and 5% or 30 employees for those with more than 150 employees. This compares with thresholds of 4 employees per month for enterprises with 20-200 employees and 2-3% or 30 employees for enterprises with more than 200 employees under the 2000 law. • Extension of probationary period. It was extended from 2 months to 1 year. <p>(OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2011, pg.123)</p>	1	<p>Νόμος 3863/2010 : Νέο Ασφαλιστικό Σύστημα και συναφείς διατάξεις, ρυθμίσεις στις εργασιακές σχέσεις https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-ergasia-koinonik-e-asphalise/n-3863-2010.html</p> <p>Νόμος 3899/2010 : Επείγοντα μέτρα εφαρμογής του προγράμματος στήριξης της ελληνικής οικονομίας https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-oikonomia/n-3899-2010.html?q=38992010</p>	Q3 2010 / Q4 2010	Q3 2010 / Q4 2010

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
GR	EPL regular workers	The length of prior notice of dismissal has been shortened to a maximum of four months, compared to 24 months for white-collar workers previously. The severance pay for white-collar workers has been reduced and subjected to ceiling of 12 months' salary. (OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2013, pg. 50)	1	Νόμος 4093/2012 : Έγκριση Μεσοπρόθεσμου Πλασίου Δημοσιονομικής Στρατηγικής 2013-2016 - Επεξηγώντας Μέτρα Εφαρμογής του ν. 4046/2012 και του Μεσοπρόθεσμου Πλασίου Δημοσιονομικής Στρατηγικής 2013-2016 https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-oikonomia/n-4093-2012.html	Q4 2012	Q4 2012
IE	EPL regular workers	Revision of the 1973 Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act (which had introduced and defined minimum notice period for dismissal [see e.g. http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1973/act/4/saction/4/enacted/en/html#sec4]. The act now applies also to employees in the Civil Service.	1	Civil Service Regulation (Amendment) Act 2005 (Act 18 of 2005) http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2005/act/18/enacted/en/print http://revisedacts.s.lawreform.ie/eli/1973/act/4/revise/en/pdf?annotations=true	Q3 2006	Q3 2005

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
IE	EPL regular workers	Revocation of rebates for redundancy payouts. Before 2012, the government paid a rebate to employers for redundancy payouts to employees of 60%; in January 2012 rebate was cut 15%; however, due statutory redundancy notice requirement, notice would have to be before mid-December 2011. Later on, in 2013 the rebate was abolished.	-1	2012 Irish budget http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2012/Documents/Summary%20of%202012%20Budget%20and%20Estimates%20Measures%20Policy%20Changes.pdf https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/budgets/budget_2012.html https://www.mhc.ie/latest/e-zines/redundancy-rebate-reduced-from-1-january-2013	Q4 2011	Q4 2011
IT	EPL regular workers	Comprehensive labour market reform (with explicit provision for monitoring of its effects) including: relaxation of employment protection rules, reduced incentives to hire on non-permanent contracts... potentially increase in flexibility on the firing side... (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2013, pg. 42) ...reform relaxed employment protection rules on permanent contracts, notably limiting the possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal.(OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2015, pg. 27)	1	Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92 Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2012/07/03/012G0115/sg	Q3 2012	Q2 2012

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
IT	EPL regular workers	Jobs Act (2015): organic reform of the labour market, which included: further reduction of judicial discretion in setting the compensation for unfair dismissals (following the 2012 Fornero reform); set rules, for newly hired workers in firms with more than 15 employees, determining severance payments increasing with job tenure in cases of unfair dismissal. (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2019 pg. 54)	1	Legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183 Deleghe al Governo in materia di riforma degli ammortizzatori sociali, dei servizi per il lavoro e delle politiche attive, nonché in materia di riordino della disciplina dei rapporti di lavoro e dell'attività ispettiva e di tutela e conciliazione delle esigenze di cura, di vita e di lavoro. (14G00196) (GU Serie Generale n.290 del 15-12-2014) https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2014/12/15/14G00196/sg Decreto Legislativo 4 marzo 2015, n. 23, in attuazione della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183. (15G00037) (GU Serie Generale n.54 del 06-03-2015) https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2015/3/6/15G00037/sg	Q1 2015	Q4 2014

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
NL	EPL regular workers	The Government decides to shorten dismissal procedures. According to the new rules, an employer can dismiss his employee at the same time or even before asking permission from the director of the Public Employment Service. (OECD Economic Surveys: Netherlands 1996, pg. 122)	1	Wet van 14 mei 1998, houdende wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945 en van enige andere wetten (Flexibiliteit en zekerheid) https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-1998-300.html	Q3 1998	Q2 1998
PT	EPL regular workers	The new Labour Code (Código do Trabalho), implemented in December 2003, replaces individual and collective labour legislation with a unified text, deemed to be clearer and easier to apply. . . employers now have the right to oppose the reinstatement of workers in dismissal cases under certain conditions, such as in cases where it would harm or disrupt business activity. (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2004, pg. 78-79). As to regular contracts, the reform eased somewhat the procedures for collective dismissal: deadlines for initiating negotiations and taking final decisions were shortened; priority given to trade union representatives and members of workers councils was eliminated. (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2008, pg. 128)	1	Lei n.º 99/2003 https://data.dre.pt/ei/lei/99/2003/08/27/p/dre/pt/html	Q4 2003	Q3 2003
PT	EPL regular workers	The introduction of the new labour code, by reducing EPL for regular contracts, is an important step in the direction of reducing labour market dualism (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2010, pg. 42)	1	Lei n. 7/2009 https://data.dre.pt/ei/lei/7/2009/02/12/p/dre/pt/html	Q1 2009	Q1 2009

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	EPL regular workers	Recent reforms introduced in 2011, 2012 and 2013 have noticeably reduced employment protection for permanent and temporary contracts. Severance pay for fair dismissals has been reduced from 30 to 12 days per year of tenure, with a 12-month ceiling instead of a 3-month floor, although existing contracts preserve some entitlements accrued under the old rules through a transition regime applied to existing contracts. Individual dismissals for economic reasons no longer need to adhere to a pre-defined order of seniority, while those based on worker capability have become possible in a wider range of circumstances. In both cases, the obligation to transfer the employee to another suitable position was replaced by a requirement on the employer to assess whether, in the case of suppression of a post, the employee could be transferred to a position compatible with his professional qualifications. These comprehensive reforms have substantially reduced employment protection against individual dismissals although it remains more stringent. Nonetheless, employment protection legislation in Portugal remains more stringent than in most OECD countries... (OECD Economic Surveys 2014, pg. 69). The first stage, implemented by Law no. 53/2011, reduced the severance pay ... to 20 days of base salary and seniority payments per full year of seniority. Additionally, it eliminated the distinction between the severance pay for expiry of the employment contract and for lawful termination of the employment contract (Martins, Labour Law in Portugal between 2011 and 2014 , pg. 6).	1	Lei n. 53/2011 https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/499541/details/maximized https://is1ssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Portuguese-National-Report.pdf	Q4 2011	Q4 2011

Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation, Regular Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	EPL regular workers	"From 1 October 2013, a further reduction in severance pay was introduced: from 20 to 12 days per year of tenure, with a temporary regime for contracts for which the duration on 1 October 2013 was inferior to three years." (LABOUR MARKET REFORMS IN PORTUGAL 2011-2015, OECD 2017, pg 128). " In return for the reduction of the severance pay value a system of guarantee was created. This system was introduced in tandem with the third stage of severance pay (Martins, Labour Law in Portugal between 2011 and 2014, pg. 6)	1	Lei n. 69/2013 & 70/2013 https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/499541/details/maximized https://is1ssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Portuguese-National-Report.pdf	Q4 2013	Q3 2013

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
BE	EPL temporary workers	...restrictions on temporary work have been reduced and fixed-term contracts made renewable. (OECD Economic Surveys: Belgium 1999 pg. 56)	1	Loi du 13 février 1998 portant des dispositions en faveur de l'emploi (dans sa teneur modifiée au 1er août 2013) https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=49186 https://www.etaa.mb.be/fr/loi-du-13-fevrier-1998_n1998012088.html	Q1 1998	Q1 1998
DE	EPL temporary workers	Legislation...widening the scope of fixed-term contracts came into force in October 1996... The maximum combined duration of fixed-term contracts was extended from 18 to 24 months, with the possibility of three renewals within this period... The employment promotion law has also made secondment of employees more flexible by extending the maximum duration from nine to twelve months. For certain types of secondment which required approval of the labour office, a mere notification is now sufficient. (OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 1997, pg.132)	1	BGBI. I 1476. Arbeitsrechtliches Gesetz zur Förderung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung (Arbeitsrechtliches Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGB1&jumpTo=bgbl196s1476.pdf http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extra/kt/ba/WP13/1217/121728.html	Q4 1996	Q4 1996

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
DE	EPL temporary workers	New legislation for TWAs (Zeitarbeit) came into force in January 2002 extending the maximal continuous time period of sub-contracts with the same user enterprise from 12 to 24 months.	1	BGBI. I 2001 S. 3443 Gesetz zur Reform der arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumente http://www.bgb1.de/xaver/bgb1/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGB1&jumpTo=bgb1101s3443.pdf	Q1 2002	Q4 2001
DE	EPL temporary workers	The Hartz I-II reforms (2003) were aimed at improving the integration of job seekers by creating new opportunities for temporary work (OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2008 pg. 82)	1	BGBI. I 2002 S. 4607 (Hartz I) https://dejure.org/BGB1/2002/BGB1.-I.S.-4607 BGBI. I 2002 S. 4621 (Hartz II) https://dejure.org/BGB1/2002/BGB1.-I.S.-4621	Q1 2003	Q4 2002
DE	EPL temporary workers	A reform in 2011 tightened regulation of temporary agency workers... (OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2014, pg. 97) . The German Act on Temporary Employment (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz; AÜG) was revised at the end of 2011.	-1	BGBI. I 2011 S. 642 Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetzes - Verhinderung von Missbrauch der Arbeitnehmerüberlassung https://dejure.org/BGB1/2011/BGB1.-I.S.-642	Q4 2011	Q2 2011

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
DE	EPL temporary workers	"Since 2017, the duration of employment on jobs filled by temporary work agency workers is limited to 18 months." OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2018 pg. 79	-1	BGBL I 2017 S. 258 Gesetz zur Reform des Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz und anderer Gesetze http://www.bgbl.de/xaaver/bgbl/startbk=Brtd.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGB1&jumpTo=bgbl117s0258.pdf	Q1 2017	Q1 2017
ES	EPL temporary workers	Temporary employment agencies ('empresas de trabajo temporal', ETs) were first authorised and regulated in Spain by law 14/1994. Previously some companies hired out workers, but without legal recognition. Royal Decree 4/1995, of 13th January, develops the Law 14/1994 [see e.g. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/fr/publications/report/2008/spain-temporary-agency-work-and-collective-bargaining-in-the-eu] [By contrast:] The reforms tightened the rules concerning fixed-term contracts. Fixed-term contracts not justified by the content or temporary nature of the job were eliminated except for older workers and the long-term unemployed. 'Ordinary' fixed term contracts, which constitute the majority of all fixed-term contracts, were not affected by the reform. Individuals whose contract expired in 1994 were permitted to renew their contracts according to the terms of the old legislation, to a maximum of three years in total. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1996, pg. 65)	1	Ley 14/1994, de 1 de junio, por la que se regulan las empresas de trabajo temporal https://www.boe.es/eli/es/1/1994/06/01/14/con Real Decreto 4/1995, de 13 de enero, por el que se desarrolla la Ley 14/1994, de 1 de junio, por la que se regulan las empresas de trabajo temporal https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rd/1995/01/13/4	Q2 1994 / Q1 1995	Q2 1994

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL temporary workers	<p>...trade unions and employers' representatives agreed on a labour market reform in April 1997. The main aim of the agreement, which was quickly passed into law (May 1997 labour legislation), was to foster stable employment and to improve the collective bargaining processes. Regarding the first objective, the new legislation attempts to reduce the large number of workers under fixed-term contracts. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1998, pg. 71-72) The 1997 agreement was valid for four years, and will expire in May 2001. Given strong job creation, and in view of the persistence of a large share of temporary work, the government encouraged the social partners to negotiate a deepening of the reform. Since the social partners could not come to an agreement after six months of discussions, the government approved new measures on EPL, together with other labor market measures... Firing costs have been introduced for temporary contracts, while the permanent contract with lower severance payments approved in 1997 has been prolonged beyond 2001, and its coverage has been extended. Male workers between 30 and 45 years are now the only group remaining on the old contract. (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 2001, pg. 67-68)</p>	-1	<p>Real Decreto-ley 8/1997, de 16 de mayo, de medidas urgentes para la mejora del mercado de trabajo y el fomento de la contratación indefinida https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/1997/05/16/8 Ley 63/1997, de 26 de diciembre, de Medidas Urgentes para la Mejora del Mercado de Trabajo y el Fomento de la Contratación Indefinida https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1997-27989&p=20010710&tn=1</p>	Q4 1997	Q2 1997

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
ES	EPL temporary workers	The labour reform contained in Law 35/2010...also focuses on facilitating intermediation in the job market by authorizing not-for-profit matching agencies to operate and eliminating operational restrictions placed on Temporary Employment Agencies, which seeks to increase the effectiveness of the market and facilitate the matching process. [see e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/nrp_spa_in_annex1_en.pdf	1	Real Decreto-ley 10/2010, de 16 de junio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/2010/06/16/10 Ley 35/2010, de 17 de septiembre, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo https://www.boe.es/eli/es/1/2010/09/17/35	Q3 2010	Q2 2010
ES	EPL temporary workers	The 2012 labour market reforms aim to reduce further the duality in the Spanish labour market, with a reform of employment protection legislation.... It further restricts the use of temporary contracts, by reinstating the maximum period of extension of a temporary contract to two years. This law was temporarily suspended... (OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 2012, pg. 98)	-1	Real Decreto-ley 3/2012, de 10 de febrero, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdl/2012/02/10/3 Ley 3/2012, de 6 de julio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral https://www.boe.es/eli/es/1/2012/07/06/3/con	Q3 2012 / Q1 2013	Q1 2012

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
FI	EPL temporary workers	Job protection raised for atypical work forms (OECD Economic Surveys: Finland 1998 pg. 57) [Finnish law dating from 1998, see e.g. http://www.scandinavi.law.se/pdf/43-11.pdf]	-1	HE 268/1998 Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Kansainvälisen työkonferenssin hyväksymien merenkulkijoiden työvälitystä koskevan yleissopimuksen ja yksityisiä työvälitystoimistoja koskevan yleissopimuksen hyväksymisestä https://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/1998/19980268 EV 278/1998 vp - HE 96/1998 vp Eduskunnan vastaus hallituksen esitykseen henkilö-tietolaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vastaus/EduskunnanVastaus/Documents/ev_278+1998.pdf	Q1 1999	Q4 1998

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
GR	EPL temporary workers	The renewal of a fixed term contract is permitted without any limitation if it is justified by an objective reason [see e.g. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/te_rmdisplay_empContracts?p_lang=en&p_expandcomments=Y&p_country=189]	1	Νόμος Π.Δ. 180/2004 Π.Δ. 180 της 23.8.2004 : Τροποποίηση του Π.Δ. 81/2003 «Πυθμίσεις για τους εργαζομένους με συμβάσεις ορισμένου χρόνου» https://www.taxheaven.gr/laws/1aw/index/law/118	Q4 2003	Q4 2003
GR	EPL temporary workers	Temporary work agency contracts. The maximum duration of fixed-term contracts for employees hired through temporary work agencies was extended to 36 months from 18 months previously and limits on the number of times that a temporary work agency contract could be renewed have been abolished. A new law in June 2011, in the context of the implementation of the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS), provided for an extension of the maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts to 36 months from 24 months previously. (OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2011, pg. 123)	1	Νόμος 3986/2011 : Επείγοντα Μέτρα Εφαρμογής Μεσοπρόθεσμου Πλασίου Δημοσιονομικής Στρατηγικής 2012-2015 https://www.e-notothesia.gr/kat-oikonomi-a/n-3986-2011.html	Q3 2011	Q3 2011
IE	EPL temporary workers	Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Workers) Act, 2003, tightened restrictions on use of temporary contracts	-1	Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2003/act/29/enacted/en/html	Q3 2003	Q3 2003

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
IT	EPL temporary workers	The “Treu package” eases regulations for new apprenticeship (nuovo apprendistato) and worktraining contracts (contratto di formazione-lavoro) and sets incentives for... temporary work via private agencies (lavoro interinale)... (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 1999, pg. 119). In 1997, a series of reforms by Labour Minister Treu (“Pacchetto Treu”) formalised evolving flexibility arrangements in Italian industry. The reforms enlarged the scope for... temporary contracts. Moreover, they permitted the opening of temporary work agencies, which even if rather limited in scope... (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2002, pg. 105-106)	1	Legge 24 giugno 1997, n. 196 Norme in materia di promozione dell'occupazione https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1997/07/04/097G0227/sg	Q3 1997	Q2 1997
IT	EPL temporary workers	This Act ruled Part-Time work, targeted for less than 40 working hours per week jobs. Part-time work can be: a) horizontal, when working time is reduced daily; b) vertical if working time is reduced weekly, monthly or yearly; or c) mixed, when both horizontal and vertical part-time work combine together. Any change in working hours of part-time contracts is allowed under the agreement of social actors (the so-called elastic or flexible clauses). For this reason this act introduced a) Supplementary work, which refers to additional working hours on horizontal part-time jobs; and b) Extraordinary work, which refers to additional working hours on vertical part-time jobs. [INSPIRES, http://www.inspires-research.eu/userfiles/D3_1%20National%20report%20Italy.pdf]	1	Decreto Legislativo 25 febbraio 2000, n. 61 Attuazione della direttiva 97/81/CE relativa all'accordo-quadro sul lavoro a tempo parziale concluso dall'UNICE, dal CEEP e dalla CES https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2000/03/20/000G0103/sg	Q2 2000	Q1 2000

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
IT	EPL temporary workers	According to directive 1999/70/CE this Law rules the whole Fixed-Term (non-standard) work issue, after its introduction in 1962. It makes the use of fixed-time work easier to hire, giving them more possibilities to hire and reducing sanctions for out-law cases. One renewal is possible only if the original contract lasts in three years, and the renewal must last in three years as well. [INSPIRES, http://www.inspires-research.eu/userfiles/D3_1%20National%20report%20Italy.pdf]	1	Decreto Legislativo n. 368 Attuazione 1999/70/CE relativa all'accordo quadro sul lavoro a tempo determinato concluso dall'UNICE, dal CEEP e dal CES https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2001/10/09/00100424/sg	Q4 2001	Q3 2001
IT	EPL temporary workers	In 2003, a new law (Biagi Law) gave the government the possibility to reform further the functioning of the labor market, with the objective of increasing employment among youth, women, older workers and job-seekers, particularly in the Mezzogiorno. The new instruments include... improved conditions for use by the firms of... non-standard forms of employment. (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2005, pg. 32) Part of this Act is specifically meant at rearranging the forms of flexible job contracts: a) converted Coordinated and Continuous Collaborations (Quasi-subordinate employment) into Project-Work and into Occasional Work; b) changed Temporary Agencies work (Lavoro Interinale) into Dispensed Work (Lavoro Somministrato); c) made more flexible the use of Part-Time work, by means of Flexible Clauses that can be agreed even without the social actors agreement. [INSPIRES, http://www.inspires-research.eu/userfiles/D3_1%20National%20report%20Italy.pdf]	1	Decreto Legislativo 10 settembre 2003, n. 276 Attuazione delle deleghe in materia di occupazione e mercato del lavoro, di cui alla legge 14 febbraio 2003, n. 30 https://www.came.ra.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/03276dl.htm	Q4 2003	Q3 2003

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
IT	EPL temporary workers	...the aim was to facilitate the use of fixed-term contracts through: abolishment of justifying reasons for fixed-term contracts and increase of the maximum number of contract's extensions from 1 to 5; shortening the interval between two consecutive fixed term contracts with the same employer from 60 to 10 days (for contracts shorter than 6 months) and from 90 to 20 days (for contracts longer than 6 months); allowing collective agreements to extend the length of fixed-term contracts above the statutory maximum (36 months). To counterbalance these measures the decree introduced a 20% cap on the share of temporary employees in the workforce – excluding firms with less than 5 employees and start-ups. The Poletti decree followed several previous reforms that since the mid-1990s attempted to facilitate the use of temporary contracts. (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2019 pg. 54)	1	("Poletti Decree") Decreto-Legge 20 marzo 2014, n. 34 Disposizioni urgenti per favorire il rilancio dell'occupazione e per la semplificazione degli adempimenti a carico delle imprese https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2014/3/20/14G00046/sg	Q2 2014	Q1 2014
IT	EPL temporary workers	Dignity Decree (2018): made it more difficult to sign temporary contracts by: allowing temporary contracts longer than 12 month only in cases of: 1) temporary and objective needs unrelated to ordinary administration; 2) replacements; 3) temporary and significant increments in activity impossible to forecast (any temporary contract not respecting these criteria is converted to a permanent contract after 12 month); limiting the length of temporary contracts without any motive to 12 months; reducing the maximum number of renewals of temporary contracts from 5 to 4; further increasing social security contributions on temporary contracts (an additional levy of 1.4% compared to permanent contract) by 0.5% at each renewal of the temporary contract. (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2019 pg. 54)	-1	Decreto-Legge 12 luglio 2018, n. 87 Disposizioni urgenti per la dignita' del lavoratore e delle imprese. (18G00112) https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2018/07/13/18G00112/sg	Q3 2018	Q3 2018

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
NL	EPL temporary workers	The Law on Flexibility and Security comes into force, changing the rules concerning the renewing of fixed term contracts... (OECD Economic Surveys: Netherlands 2002, pg. 90) The Flexibility and Security Law (Flex Law) – introduced in January 1999 – has promoted the use of flexible working contracts and increased employment with a limited duration and a variable number of working hours. The Law has changed the rules on the renewal of fixed term contracts, with a maximum of two renewals in three years, after which period the employee is assumed to have a permanent position. Similar rules apply for employees of temporary work agencies, giving them the right of a permanent contract after three consecutive contracts with the agency... (OECD Economic Surveys: Netherlands 2000, pg. 60, pg. 115)	1	Wet van 14 mei 1998, houdende wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945 en van enige andere wetten (Flexibiliteit en zekerheid) https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-1998-300.html	Q3 1998	Q2 1998

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
NL	EPL temporary workers	In July 2015, employment protection legislation was reformed to increase the protection of employees on temporary contracts and to reduce the protection of permanent contracts. The duration of consecutive temporary contracts has been shortened from 3 to 2 years and the period between two consecutive contracts extended from 3 to 6 months. Regarding permanent contracts, the government has capped severance payments (at EUR 75 000 or a year's salary, whichever is higher) and linked them to tenure rather than age. Further narrowing the difference between the two types of employment by lowering the cap on severance payments even more and ensuring the dismissal system works efficiently could make the transition from temporary to permanent work more common, and more people on permanent contracts could increase on-the-job learning and access to training and, thereby, productivity. (OECD Economic Surveys: Netherlands 2016, pag 41) The old 3*3*3 rule (needing to get an open ended contract after having 3 consecutive temporary contracts for a maximum of 3 years, and with the option of a new chain beginning if the employment relation has been stopped for at least 3 month) is converted into a 2*2*6 rule: now max duration of 2 years and maximum of 2 consecutive contracts. Some political parties fear that people with temporary jobs will become redundant after two years (and two contracts) instead of three. Following the latter concern, the implementation of the reduction in the maximum amount of consecutive temporary contracts, has been postponed until July 2015. (LABREF)	-1	Wet Werk en Zekerheid https://wetten.Overheid.nl/BWBR0035254/2016-01-01	Q1 2015/Q3 2015	Q2 2014

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	EPL temporary workers	The need for greater flexibility of labor is recognized by the "Short-term Social Pact" of January 1996 which calls inter alia for a more flexible organization of working time, largely based upon reduced job demarcation. (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 1996, pg. 119). The Social Pact was transposed into law in 1999. [https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/2004WestEuropeanPolitics.pdf]	1	Acordo de Concertação Social de Curto Prazo https://aps.pt/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/DPR462dba737c84e_1.pdf Lei n.º 58/99 https://data.dre.pt/eli/lei/58/1999/06/30/p/dre/pt/html	Q2 1999	(Q1 1996) Q2 1999

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	EPL temporary workers	<p>New legislation for fixed-term employment contracts came into effect in August 2001, tightening the rules of such contracts in the private sector. One of the objectives of the law was to ensure that workers who, de facto, were employed on permanent jobs would benefit from a standard permanent employment contract. As a result, temporary contracts are now covered by a set of strict rules governing their scope and termination conditions. In particular, they may be used only in special situations indicated in the law, corresponding to temporary labour force needs (Other features of the law include: i) the termination by the employer of a contract in force over 12 months, will imply that that job position cannot be filled by another employee for the next 6 months; and ii) employees with a fixed-term contract have the right to receive 6 months' basic pay if they are replaced by a new recruit who is given a standard contract to perform the same functions.) The maximum legal length of general fixed-term contracts in the private sector is 3 years (Either consecutive or interrupted (i.e. in the cases where the employee is asked to take breaks between contracts).) Then the legal status of the fixed-term contract is automatically changed into a standard (open ended) contract (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2003, pg. 115)</p>	-1	Lei n.º 18/2001 https://data.dre.pt/eli/lei/18/2001/07/03/p/dre/pt/html	Q3 2001	Q2 2001

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	EPL temporary workers	The new Labour Code (Código do Trabalho); which came into force in December 2003, replaces individual and collective labour legislation with a unified text, deemed to be clearer and easier to apply ... For temporary employment, the new labour code provides more flexibility in the use of fixed term contracts, increasing the allowed duration of such contracts. Moreover, there is now more leeway to introduce flexibility in collective agreements at the firm level regarding dismissal rules and the rules on fixed-term contracting. (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2008, pg. 128) The new legislation provides more flexibility in the use of fixed-term contracts, which can now be renewed up to a maximum six years (instead of three years previously); at the same time it gives more transparency to these forms of contracting (The current regime for fixed-term contracts clarifies the rules for the use of successive contracts; it establishes specific training obligations for workers under this type of contracts and compensation to the worker if termination is decided by employer. (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2004, pg. 77-79)	1	Lei n.º 99/2003 https://data.dre.pt/eli/lei/99/2003/08/27/p/dre/pt/html	Q4 2003	Q3 2003
PT	EPL temporary workers	In Portugal, the maximum permitted assignment was increased from one to two years by Law 19/2007 [see e.g. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef0899en.pdf]	1	Lei n.º 19/2007 https://data.dre.pt/eli/lei/19/2007/05/22/p/dre/pt/html	Q2 2007	Q1 2007

Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation, Temporary Workers

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	EPL temporary workers	"Finally, from 1 October 2013, severance pay was further reduced to 18 days per year of tenure, up to the ceilings defined above. As in the case of open-ended contracts, rights accrued to date were preserved, so that three separate regimes are now applicable, depending upon when the original contract was signed" (LABOUR MARKET REFORMS IN PORTUGAL 2011-2015 © OECD 2017 , pg 129)	1	Lei n.º 69/2013 https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/499541/details/maximized	Q4 2013	Q3 2013

Table 3: Unemployment Benefit Systems

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
DE	Unemployment benefits	An important element of the “Agenda 2010” is the reduction in the duration of unemployment benefit entitlements. From 2006 onwards, unemployed individuals who become unemployed when they are aged 55 and older will be entitled to a maximum of 18 instead of 32 months of unemployment insurance benefit. Job seekers up to 55 years of age will receive unemployment insurance benefit for at most 12 months. Moreover, a new second tier unemployment benefit, to be introduced in 2005, replaces two previous benefit systems as recommended in the 2003 Economic Survey. Up to now the latter provides means-tested benefits after the first tier unemployment insurance benefit entitlements lapse at slightly lower replacement ratios. (OECD Economic Surveys Germany 2004, pg 78)	1	Zweites Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startrtkk=Bundesanzeiger_BGB1&jumpTo=bgbl102s4621.pdf	Q1 2006	Q4 2002
IE	Unemployment benefits	The weekly payment of unemployment benefits (Jobseeker’s Benefit and Jobseeker’s Allowance) will be reduced from 204.3 Euro to 196.0 Euro (minus 8.3 Euro or minus 4.1%). The same reduction affects all social welfare payments. (LABREF)	1	2010 Irish Budget http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2010/2010.aspx	Q1 2010	Q4 2009
IE	Unemployment benefits	The weekly payment of unemployment benefits (Jobseeker’s Benefit and Jobseeker’s Allowance) will be reduced from 196.0 Euro to 188.0 Euro (minus 8.0 Euro or minus 4.1%). For recipients aged 22-24 the weekly rate is reduced further to 144.0 Euro. The same reductions affects all social welfare payments (LABREF)	1	2011 Irish Budget http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2011/2011.aspx	Q1 2011	Q4 2010

Table 3: Unemployment Benefit Systems

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
IT	Unemployment benefits	<p>The Jobs Act further extends the coverage of unemployment benefits, consistent with easing EPL, thus bringing Italy closer to a “flexicurity” approach. The Jobs Act integrates ASpl and mini-ASpl, thus harmonising their different eligibility requirements and durations. The “new ASpl” will be paid for a duration reflecting the number of weeks of contributions over a longer reference period and it will be extended – on an experimental basis – to around 350 000 project workers (currently excluded from the protection). (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2015 pg. 68) In 2015, Italy enacted a comprehensive labour market reform – the Jobs Act – and introduced temporary cuts to employers’ social security contributions. Coverage and duration of unemployment benefits were increased, bringing Italy closer to a “flexicurity” approach by enhancing flexibility and security in the labour at the same time. (OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2017 pg. 129)</p>	-1	<p>Legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183 Deleghe al Governo in materia di riforma degli ammortizzatori sociali, dei servizi per il lavoro e delle politiche attive, nonché in materia di riordino della disciplina dei rapporti di lavoro e dell’attività ispettiva e di tutela e conciliazione delle esigenze di cura, di vita e di lavoro. (14G00196) (Jobs Act) https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2014/12/15/14G00196/sg Decreto Legislativo 4 marzo 2015, n. 22, in attuazione della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183. (15G00036) https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2015/3/6/15G00036/sg</p>	Q1 2015	Q4 2014

Table 3: Unemployment Benefit Systems

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
NL	Unemployment benefits	The government plans to lower the maximum duration of unemployment benefit from 5 years to 38months in October 2006. (OECD Economic Surveys: Netherlands 2006, pg. 15)	1	Besluit van 28 juni 2006 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de Wet wijziging WW-stelsel https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2006-304.html	Q4 2006	Q2 2006
NL	Unemployment benefits	"In July 2015, employment protection legislation was reformed to increase the protection of employees on temporary contracts and to reduce the protection of permanent contracts. The duration of consecutive temporary contracts has been shortened from 3 to 2 years and the period between two consecutive contracts extended from 3 to 6 months. Regarding permanent contracts, the government has capped severance payments (at EUR 75 000 or a year's salary, whichever is higher) and linked them to tenure rather than age. Further narrowing the difference between the two types of employment by lowering the cap on severance payments even more and ensuring the dismissal system works efficiently could make the transition from temporary to permanent work more common, and more people on permanent contracts could increase on-the-job learning and access to training and, thereby, productivity." (OECD Economic Surveys: Netherlands 2016, pag 41) Reduced duration of unemployment benefits as a function of the contributory period. Reducing the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to 2 years (LABREF)	1	Wet Werk en Zekerheid https://wetten.Overheid.nl/BWBR0035254/2016-01-01	Q1 2016	Q2 2014

Table 3: Unemployment Benefit Systems

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	Unemployment benefits	Increase in the duration of unemployment benefits for workers aged 40 and above (see e.g. detailed description in A. Novo and A. Silva (2017), "Can a Search Model Predict the Effects of an Increase in the Benefit Duration? Evidence from the Portuguese Unemployment Insurance Reform", IZA Journal of Labor Policy 6 (3))	-1	Decreto-Lei n.º 119/99 https://data.dre.pt/eli/dec-lei/119/1999/04/14/pdre/pt/html Portaria n.º 481-A/99 https://data.dre.pt/eli/port/481-a/1999/06/30/pdre/pt/html	Q2 1999	Q2 1999

Table 3: Unemployment Benefit Systems

Country	Type	Content	Direction	Source	Date of Implementation	Date of Decision/Adoption
PT	Unemployment benefits	To tackle disincentives to work, the ceiling to unemployment insurance has been lowered by one sixth, a 10% benefit reduction applies after six months and under certain conditions jobseekers who take up a full-time job paying less than the benefit will be able to temporarily retain part of the latter... (OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2012, pg. 34-35) [See also https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/Labor-market-reforms-in-Portugal-2011-2015-preliminary-assessment.pdf , pg. 37: In 2012, Portugal introduced reforms which facilitated access to unemployment benefits, while reducing their generosity (both in terms of duration and the replacement rate)... Maximum benefit duration was reduced from 900 to 540 days (depending on contributory history and age) – although additional increments based on contributory history were maintained, meaning that benefit duration for those with a long contribution history (and especially those aged over 50) could exceed this maximum. In the interest of protecting workers during the current crisis, the new rules would only start applying from the individual's second unemployment spell after the reform onwards. In the case of individuals aged 40 or over, the duration of unemployment assistance was increased (again, from the second unemployment spell onwards). The maximum amount of unemployment insurance that an individual could receive was reduced from three times the IAS to 2.5 times the IAS (but there was a temporary increase of 10% in unemployment insurance for individuals in workless households). In addition, Portugal introduced a declining replacement rate rule for unemployment insurance: benefits are reduced by 10% after six months to encourage job search effort.]	1	Decreto-Lei n.º 64/2012 https://data.dre.pt/eli/dec-lei/64/2012/03/15/pt/dre/pt/html	Q1 2012	Q1 2012

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